What Happened

The pharmacist in charge at an Alabama pharmacy over-ordered tens of thousands of oxycodone pills beyond what the pharmacy ever dispensed to patients, then resold the surplus to other drug distributors.

The pharmacist in charge worked at Midtown Pharmacy in Gadsden, Alabama, from February 2018 until 2023. Between 2015 and late 2021, records showed Midtown Pharmacy ordered at least 80,000 more oxycodone pills than the pharmacy ever dispensed to patients. He diverted the surplus opioid pills and sold them to other drug distributors, regularly taking distributor stock bottles from his pharmacy to his house, where he repackaged the pills into plastic bags for resale. He admitted to earning about $450,000 in illicit income from the scheme, which he failed to report on his federal tax returns; during a search of his house, authorities found more than $110,000 in cash.

He pleaded guilty in July 2023 to one count of conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled substances and three counts of filing false tax returns. He was sentenced on November 3, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama to 54 months in prison, ordered to forfeit $110,620 in illicit drug proceeds, and ordered to pay $124,547 in restitution to the IRS. The case was investigated jointly by the FBI, DEA, and IRS.

What Went Wrong

A pharmacist in charge was able to systematically over-order oxycodone and resell the surplus for years before the scheme was caught. Key failures included:

  • Wholesaler ordering volumes were not reconciled against the pharmacy's actual dispensing records to catch a persistent gap of tens of thousands of pills.
  • The pharmacist in charge controlled both ordering and dispensing oversight, with no independent check on his own purchasing patterns.
  • Distributor suspicious-order monitoring did not flag or halt years of oxycodone orders that consistently outpaced the pharmacy's patient volume.

How It Could Have Been Prevented

  • Reconcile wholesaler ordering volumes against actual dispensing records on a routine, independent basis to catch a persistent gap between what is ordered and what patients receive.
  • Require suspicious-order monitoring systems to flag pharmacies whose oxycodone orders substantially and persistently exceed their dispensing history.
  • Provide independent, external audit of a pharmacist-in-charge's own ordering and inventory activity rather than relying on self-oversight.
  • Cross-reference pharmacy financial records against reported income to surface unexplained cash flow tied to drug proceeds.

Related Guidance

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