What Happened

An indictment unsealed in Detroit on October 22, 2026 charges five people, including three doctors, with conspiracy to illegally distribute prescription opioids through a fraudulent "cash only" clinic, along with related drug and money laundering offenses.

The indictment alleges that from 2018 through September 2024, Clara Wilkerson, 65, formerly of Bloomfield Hills, used her companies, CRW Worldwide, LLC and CRW Development, Inc., to recruit and pay doctors to illegally prescribe controlled substances at fraudulent medical clinics. Latanya Wallace-Hardiman, 53, of Detroit, owned and operated one of those clinics, Woodward Boulevard Medical Building (WBMB) in Detroit. Dr. Luis Rodriguez, 53, now of Orlando, Florida; Dr. Nayantara Jnananand, 59, of Plymouth; and Dr. Prashanti Franklin, 49, of Okemos, worked at WBMB at various times and allegedly prescribed opioids with high street value, including Oxycodone 30mg, Oxymorphone 40mg (Opana), Hydrocodone-acet (Norco) and Oxycodone-acet 10-325 (Percocet).

According to the release, "patients" paid $250-$500 in cash for a visit that resulted in a prescription for the opioid they requested. The clinic refused insurance and charged the fee only when the prescription was obtained; if a patient could not fill it, WBMB gave a "credit" toward the next visit. New patients were asked "who sent you" and turned away if they could not name a trusted marketer or employee. Patient recruiters at times paid their "patients" $100 or more, covered the office fee and the pharmacy copay, collected the pills and sold them on the street market.

During 2021-2024, doctors at WBMB issued prescriptions for over 500,000 dosage units of Schedule II controlled substances worth over $4.6 million on the street market. Doctors at another clinic, P & A Aftercare, issued prescriptions for over 1.9 million dosage units worth over $10 million. Wilkerson and Wallace-Hardiman are also charged with money laundering conspiracy and money laundering tied to the cash the clinics received, which was allegedly used to pay the doctors. Each drug and money laundering count carries a maximum of 20 years in prison and/or a $250,000 fine. DEA special agents and diversion investigators and IRS Criminal Investigation investigated the case. An indictment is only a charge and is not evidence of guilt.

What Went Wrong

As alleged, this was a prescribing scheme built to look like medical practice while avoiding the checks that usually expose pill mills:

  • Prescriptions sold, not prescribed. The fee was charged only when the requested opioid prescription was written, and a "credit" was issued if it could not be filled. Payment was tied to the drug, not to an evaluation.
  • No insurance, no payer review. By refusing insurance, the clinic kept its prescribing out of claims data. The U.S. Attorney noted that not billing insurers will not prevent prosecution.
  • Gatekeeping to avoid detection. Asking every new patient "who sent you" and rejecting anyone without a trusted referral screened out people who might report the clinic.
  • Third parties paying for patients. Recruiters paid office fees and pharmacy copays and took the pills, so the person named on the prescription was not the person who kept the drug.
  • High-value products at high volume. The alleged prescribing centered on high-strength opioids with high street value, totaling hundreds of thousands of Schedule II dosage units.

How It Could Have Been Prevented

  • Pharmacists exercising corresponding responsibility should question cash-only prescriptions for high-strength opioids from a single clinic, especially when many patients present with similar prescriptions.
  • Pharmacies should watch for one person paying copays or picking up for several patients, and decline fills that cannot be resolved with the prescriber.
  • Prescribers asked to work at clinics that pay per prescription, refuse insurance or require referrals from "marketers" should treat those terms as warning signs and decline.
  • Distributors and pharmacies can flag prescribers whose Schedule II volume is far above peers and whose patients pay cash, and report suspicious patterns to DEA.

Related Guidance

Sources